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Collective Amnesia and Epistemic Injustice  
Alessandra Tanesini 
Abstract 
Communities often respond to traumatic events in their histories by destroying objects that 
would cue memories of a past they wish to forget and by building artefacts which memorialize a 
new version of their history. Hence, it would seem, communities cope with change by spreading 
memory ignorance so to allow new memories to take root. This chapter offers an account of 
some aspects of this phenomenon and of its epistemological consequences. Specifically, it is 
demonstrated in this chapter that collective forgetfulness is harmful. Here, the focus is 
exclusively on the harms caused by its contribution to undermining the intellectual self-trust of 
some members of the community. Further, since some of these harms are also wrongs, collective 
amnesia contributes to causing epistemic injustices. 
Keywords 




The toppling of statues memorializing Saddam Hussein by angry crowds was one of the most 
iconic images following regime change in Iraq. This example is not unique. Communities often 
respond to traumatic events in their histories by destroying objects that would cue memories of a 
past they wish to forget and by building artefacts which memorialize a new version of their 
history. Hence, it would seem, communities cope with change by spreading memory ignorance 
so to allow new memories to take root. 
In this chapter, I offer an account of some aspects of this phenomenon and of its 
epistemological consequences.1 This chapter has three aims. The first is to show that the 
formation and maintenance of collective memories requires that other events are to some extent 
forgotten. All shared memories, including those which are shared by a large group, are the result 
of mechanisms that transform initially divergent recollections of the past into an agreed account. 
Those memories which do not survive this process so that they are excluded from the shared 
version become forgotten through neglect. The second is to argue that sometimes collective 
mnemonic silence or forgetfulness is not a mere by-product of the formation of memory. Instead, 
cognitive effort is specifically directed towards bringing about ignorance. Ignorance, in these 
instances, is a perverse kind of success. I reserve the term ‘collective amnesia’ for collective 
forgetfulness of this kind. The final aim is to demonstrate that collective forgetfulness is 
harmful.2 Here, I focus exclusively on the harms caused by its contribution to undermining the 
                                                 
1 Earlier versions of this chapter were delivered in Cardiff and at the 2nd conference on Socially Extended 
Knowledge held in Edinburgh on 8–9 October 2015. I would like to thank the organizers of those events 
for the invitations and the audiences for their questions and suggestions. Special thanks to Chloe Wall, 
Kirk Michaelian, Duncan Pritchard and Orestis Palermos for their comments on a penultimate draft. 
2 It is worth noting from the start that some of the harms inflicted by collective amnesia can also result 
from other kinds of memory ignorance. However, ignorance which results from cognitive ability has a 
stability that other forms of ignorance may lack. It is therefore likely to be harder to remove. Hence, 
intellectual self-trust of some members of the community. Further, since some of these harms are 
also wrongs, collective amnesia contributes to causing epistemic injustices. 
The chapter consists of seven sections. In the first I review some of the psychological 
literature on human biological memory which shows its outputs to be highly constructed. For this 
reason, biological memory is not well-suited to produce faithful and detailed reproductions of 
past events. It is, however, adaptive since its functions include: first, forming and strengthening 
social bonds; and second, laying down representations to be used to imagine future possible 
events for planning purposes. In the second section I focus on the first of these functions served 
by memory and explain how shared and collective memories are formed and sustained. In this 
section I highlight the selective nature of memory formation and show how mnemonic silence or 
forgetfulness is an essential component of the mechanisms by which a shared version of a 
common past is developed. 
In sections 10.3 and 10.4 I lay the ground for the account, offered in section 10.5, of 
collective amnesia which I define as memory ignorance constituting a cognitive achievement. In 
section 10.3 I introduce the notion of scaffolded cognition and specifically of scaffolded 
memory. The term ‘scaffold’ is usually reserved for artefacts, strategies, modes of teaching, or 
environmental niches that lower the cognitive load required to carry out successfully a cognitive 
task and that may even extend the range of activities within the grasp of an individual. In this 
chapter, I advance and defend a more extended usage of the term to refer to all those 
environments, strategies, and devices that brace human cognition but which may increase as well 
as lower cognitive loads and may serve as barriers to success in some cognitive tasks. Memory 
                                                 
ignorance of this kind is of special interest to those concerned with addressing epistemic harms and 
wrongs. 
is, by all accounts, a highly scaffolded cognitive capacity; whilst the existence of scaffolds to 
facilitate memory is usually appreciated, the presence of scaffolds for forgetfulness is equally 
important. In section 10.4 I flesh out the idea that ignorance can be an achievement understood 
as a success due to cognitive ability. Section 10.5 provides a definition of collective amnesia as 
collective memory ignorance which is an achievement and supplies some examples of the 
phenomenon. 
In section 10.6 I rely on the idea that collective memories strengthen social bonds, by 
providing a positive image of one’s group with which one can identify, to argue that collective 
memories can either enhance or undermine intellectual self-trust. I also show that forgetfulness 
of some aspects of the shared past often functions to undermine the self-trust of some members 
of the community because of how they are represented (if at all) in its collective memories. 
Finally, in section seven I conclude that individuals whose self-trust is undermined by collective 
amnesia are not only harmed by it but also wronged. Hence, since intellectual self-trust is a pre-
requisite for the exercise of any epistemic capacity, the wrong done by collective amnesia 
constitutes a deeper kind of epistemic injustice. 
10.1 Human Biological Memory  
With a few exceptions, philosophers working on the epistemology of memory tend to subscribe 
to the so-called archival model of memory.3 According to this view we store representations of 
                                                 
3 This model is still commonplace in analytic discussions in epistemology which assume that memory is a 
belief forming mechanism dedicated to secure faithful representations of past events or of previously 
acquired information (Martin and Deutscher 1966; Bernecker 2010). It should be noted that this model 
events experienced and facts learnt in the brain. These representations are memories. They are 
thought as beliefs and images which can be made accessible when explicitly recalled. This model 
has been largely abandoned in the cognitive psychology of memory. The dominant view in that 
discipline, a view which is supported by a growing body of empirical evidence, is that memory is 
largely constructed on the hoof from sketchy and selective representations (known as memory 
traces or engrams) encoded in the brain (Schacter et al. 1995; Schacter 2012). 
The idea that memories are constructed should not be taken to mean that they are fantasies. 
Rather the thought is that remembering does not consist in storing beliefs and images in the mind 
for future, hopefully unadulterated, retrieval. Instead, relevance and context determine which 
representations of current experience are initially encoded. These may well include 
representations that are not believed or endorsed. These representations are modified in the light 
of background information, cognitive schemas, and heuristics as they are consolidated ready for 
storage. Whilst stored, representations become harder or easier to retrieve. Retrieval is facilitated 
when representations have been frequently retrieved before. It is inhibited by lack of past 
retrieval. Inhibition is exacerbated if related representations are retrieved instead. Context, 
current purposes, and ease of access contribute to determine which representations are retrieved 
at any given moment. These and other factors also determine whether the retrieved 
                                                 
is presupposed even by supporters of qualified generativism about memory knowledge. See Michaelian 
(2016, pp. 93–6) for a discussion. In the philosophy of mind, however, philosophers whose work is 
informed by cognitive science and other psychological disciplines have abandoned this model in 
favour of accounts that acknowledge the close connection between memory and imagination. See for 
example: Sutton et al. (2010); Michaelian (2012, 2016); and Michaelian and Sutton (2013). 
representations are endorsed as genuine memories suitable for belief formation (Michaelian 2012 
and 2016). 
These constructive features of the cognitive processes of memory encoding, consolidation, 
and retrieval help to explain several important features of human biological memory which make 
it very different from external memory storage artefacts such as diaries and computing devices. 
Human biological memories are condensed, selective, and malleable; they trade precision for 
accuracy but can also be inaccurate. Consider, for example, memories of summer holidays. 
These memories are often condensed. I spent most summers in my childhood at the seaside; 
when I recollect those days now, I have a generic memory of summers by the sea which is 
probably a condensation of many distinct events taking place over several years. My memory is 
selective since there is much that I do not recall. It is malleable since it has changed over the 
years under the influence of conversations with my sisters. Even when I have a distinct 
recollection of a specific event, my memory is accurate at the price of being precise. I may 
remember that I wore a dark jumper without remembering its exact colour. In addition, and as it 
is well known, our memories often betray us so that what we seem to remember turns out to be in 
small or large part false. 
It is tempting to conclude that human biological memory does not serve us very well 
because it does not preserve faithful representations of the past. This conclusion would be 
misguided since it is predicated on the assumption that preservation of mental content is the sole 
function of memory. Recent work in cognitive psychology, however, strongly indicates that 
memory also serves altogether different purposes. One of its primary epistemic functions is to 
assist planning future activities (Schacter 2012). We encode representations in the brain 
(memory traces or engrams) in a way that makes them suitable for use when imagining possible 
future events. Of course, these can also be retrieved in recollection; but the role of these 
representations in imagination has determined some of their most significant characteristics 
(Schacter 2012). 
A second primary purpose of memory is to create and strengthen social bonds. If individuals 
come to agree about the past, their shared recollections bring intimate couples closer together 
and increase the feeling of belonging in individual members of social groups. The accuracy, 
faithfulness, or completeness of memories do not directly contribute to its ability to fulfil this 
function since its goal is convergence onto a shared version of the past (which may or may not be 
truthful). The malleability and selectivity of memory promote agreement; they are, therefore, 
adaptive features even though they may undermine the reliability of this faculty.4 
10.2 Shared and Collective Memories  
This picture of the functions served by human biological memory makes sense of features of 
collaborative remembering which would be inexplicable if the purpose of memory were 
                                                 
4 Michaelian (2016) argues that one should not infer from the constructed nature of episodic memory that 
it must be generally unreliable. This chapter is neutral on this issue. My focus is exclusively on those 
memories that serve primarily the function of strengthening social bonds. I argue that these memories 
are highly selective in ways that serve the interests of some people rather than of others. I do not claim 
that these memories are always inaccurate but that they are often misleading. Since episodic memories 
also serve other functions, no conclusion about the reliability of episodic memory in general should be 
derived from these points. 
exclusively to store and retrieve accurate representations of the past.5 Think, for instance, of 
school reunions, their main or sole purpose is to preserve or rekindle a social bond. When people 
get together during these occasions, they do catch up with each other but a lot of the time is spent 
reminiscing about the shared past. Since these are the events that each participant remembers, the 
point of the activity cannot be the transmission or creation of knowledge. Rather, the point must 
be to make the individuals feel closer to each other by enhancing their sense that they belong to a 
group whose members have things in common. This is why we are disappointed and feel left out 
if at these events others have forgotten what we remember. If the point of the exercise were 
knowledge transmission, the appropriate response would be to try to impart to others the 
knowledge they have lost.6 
                                                 
5 The processes by which shared memories are formed are usually described as collaborative 
remembering because they are often thought as cooperative activities. Although I retain the label to 
indicate that I am discussing the same phenomena, my emphasis here is on the often conflictual nature 
of these processes. 
6 Of course, there may well be instances when we remember together to try to arrive at an accurate 
account of the past. Further, there is evidence of memory facilitation when individuals form a group to 
carry out a memory task. However, although members of a group recollect more relevant facts than 
each would in isolation, the amount of information remembered by the whole group is, because of 
memory inhibition, less than the sum of what would be remembered by each were they to carry out the 
memory task in isolation. Thus, if we wanted to maximize memory we should ask people to remember 
in isolation a different part of a task and then collect their individual memories to obtain their sum. 
See, Hirst and Echterhoff (2011) for the phenomena of inhibition and facilitation. 
Collaborative remembering is one of the main mechanisms by which all close personal 
relations are formed, sustained, and enhanced. For this reason, couples and close friends or 
family members spend a lot of time sharing memories of past experiences. Recollecting together 
strengthens social bonds in several ways. Firstly, it makes salient that past which one has in 
common with some others. This idea of a common feature—be it a past, or a preference, or a 
point of view—is sufficient to engender a sense of belonging to a group. But, secondly, shared 
memories are particularly apt at facilitating the creation of strongly bonded groups based on 
shared identities. In the same way in which autobiographical memory plays a crucial role in an 
individual’s self-conception, memories of a common past often contribute to thinking of some 
social group, to which one belongs, as defining of one aspect of one’s identity. Thus, one way of 
strengthening the sense that a given social group is defining of who one is, is to feel that the 
memories of the group’s past are the memories of one’s past, which one shares with other 
members of that identity defining group. 
This shared past, which brings people together, however, is to a significant extent 
constructed through the process of collaborative remembering. As I explained in section 10.1, 
constructed memories are not mere fantasies, they are however selective and condensed. These 
features also pertain to shared memories whose construction is the outcome of social processes 
shaping initially divergent individual memories so that they converge towards one version of the 
past which subsequently is remembered by each person involved. 
Recent empirical studies on intimate couples who have been together for a long time show 
that their collaborative remembering can display features that are characteristic of transactive 
memory systems (Sutton et al. 2010). A transactive memory system is a dynamic system that 
includes memory sub-systems (such as an individual’s memory) and the processes by which 
these communicate. Since its component sub-systems are socially coupled and exhibit 
continuous reciprocal causation, the system as a whole acquires a range of emergent properties 
(Wegner 1987; Tollefsen, Dale, and Paxton 2013). Some of these features are present when 
couples engage in free-flowing conversation about their past (Hirst and Echterhoff 2011). 
For example, each member of the couple continuously supplies cues to the other in 
conversation. This cross-cuing activity enhances individual memory by facilitating the recall of 
memories which the person would not have retrieved un-prompted. Other mechanisms are 
responsible for mnemonic convergence so that the memories of each member of the couple are 
eventually in broad agreement with those of the other to form a shared version of their past. The 
most extensively studied mechanism, among these, is known as socially shared retrieval induced 
forgetting (hereafter, SS-RIF) whose effect have been robustly demonstrated in the cognitive 
psychological literature (Stone et al. 2012; Hirst and Manier 2008). 
Early studies show that in laboratory conditions the explicit retrieval by a person of some 
semantic information makes in the short term semantically related but unretrieved information 
harder to remember than what is equally unretrieved but bears no semantic connection to the 
retrieved information. In the standard experiment participants are presented lists of category-
exemplar pairs such as animal-cat; animal-dog; vegetable-spinach; vegetable-broccoli. They are 
made to practise retrieving some cued pairs and not others by being asked to complete them: 
animal-d___, for example but not animal-c___ or vegetable-s___. A retrieval induced forgetting 
effect is found if pairs (such as vegetable-spinach) which have not been practised but are not 
semantically related to the practised pairs are better remembered than those pairs which have 
also not been practised but are semantically related to the practised pairs (animal-cat, for 
instance) (Coman, Manier and Hirst, 2009). 
The studies on the reminiscing of couples in conversations have shown that the same effect 
can be observed when the memories concern autobiographical events rather than semantic 
information, when remembering is done in spontaneous conversation rather than prompted in a 
laboratory, and that the effect is socially shared so that it is observed both in the person who 
explicitly retrieves a memory, but also in the other partner who at that point is listening (Coman 
and Hirst 2012). Thus, when a person mentions in recollection some features of a past event but 
is silent about others, the neglected aspects have become, for both participants in the dialogue, 
harder to recall than other events which were not the topic of conversation. 
Although the lesson learnt from the study of autobiographical memory in individuals, dyads, 
and small groups cannot be automatically applied to larger groups, there is sufficient evidence to 
support the view that communities also share enduring memories (including of events that 
current members have not directly witnessed) which are part of the group’s identity.7 These 
memories are generally called ‘collective memories’ (Hirst and Manier 2008; Stone and Hurst 
2014). For instance, memories of heroism and pointless death during World War I, of Scott’s 
tragic polar expedition, or of warm beer and games of cricket have all become part of the 
collective memory of the British people. Collective memories are also largely constructed by 
processes of collaborative remembering which select events that are defining of the group’s 
identity and may mark turning points in its history. They contribute to sustaining the idea of a 
national character and to determining its features. In Britain, these include, for instance: self-
                                                 
7 Hence, collective memories are generative of content since they enable individuals to have quasi-
autobiographical memories of events which they did not personally experience. Consequently, there is 
a tendency in some research on the topic to include the whole recorded history of a group among its 
collective memories. 
sacrifice, courage, fair-play, being a good loser, and a spirit of adventure. Collective memories, 
hence, set out what it takes to be part of the group, strengthen a sense of belonging in those who 
feel represented by them, and, since they are often positive, enhance their self-esteem. Collective 
memories may also comprise memories of events that mark some groups of individuals as 
outsiders or even enemies. In Britain one is reminded of the enduring salience of memories of 
World War II every time the English football team is scheduled to play against Germany. 
Collective memories are transmitted from generation to generation through social learning 
(Sutton 2016). They are also continually formed and transformed through experience. These 
processes of formation and transformation include mechanisms which lead to mnemonic 
convergence of initially disparate individual memories. One such mechanism is social contagion, 
which occurs when a fabricated ‘memory’ or misleading information is implanted in 
unsuspecting listeners (Hirst and Manier 2008). Contagion may involve post-event 
misinformation effects when witnesses, who have first-hand experience of an event, claim to 
remember what is in fact misinformation which they have been fed after their experience (Loftus 
2005).8 Social contagion is not rare and does not occur only when the misinformation is 
impersonally presented. Speakers can impose a new memory on their listeners; the effect is 
especially strong when one person arrogates for herself or himself the role of narrator and thus 
succeeds in monopolizing the conversation (Brown, Coman, and Hirst 2009). Further, people 
who are perceived as experts by their audience, and socially powerful individuals can more 
easily implant new ‘memories’ in their listeners than those who lack status or are not thought to 
have expertise (see Hirst and Echterhoff 2011 for a review). 
                                                 
8 Such misinformation may include complete fabrication. 
In addition to social contagion, memories converge among members of a group because of 
re-exposure and retrieval effects. Repetition of known memories facilitates future remembering 
especially for the speaker who recounts the events (Hirst and Echterhoff 2011). Further, since 
speakers often tune their messages to the attitudes they attribute to their listeners, the audience 
can indirectly affect what a speaker will in future remember. For example, speakers may be 
discerning about how to phrase a potentially ambiguous point, such as describing a person as 
stingy or as being careful with money. Since re-exposure facilitates memory, unsurprisingly 
researchers have found that speakers subsequently tend to remember events in the terms in which 
they have presented them to their audience (this is known as the saying-is-believing effect) (Hirst 
and Echterhoff 2011). 
Best known among the retrieval effects is induced forgetting. I have already discussed the 
phenomenon above with regards to dyads and small groups. There is now empirical evidence 
that its effects can be propagated throughout a group to individuals who are only indirectly 
related to the original speaker or speakers (Yamashiro and Hirst 2014).9 Further the effect is 
present when one person addresses a large audience (Stone and Hirst 2014). Several factors 
mediate the presence of SS-RIF but their interaction is not well-understood. It is generally 
accepted that the mechanism underlying SS-RIF is covert retrieval, alongside the speaker, of the 
explicitly mentioned memories. If this account is correct, it would explain why no effect is found 
                                                 
9 Thanks to Kirk Michaelian for pointing out that these results underplay the role of conflictual processes 
in memory formation. The focus on memory convergence in small groups has led researchers to focus 
on collaboration. But the same degree of cooperation cannot be attributed to members of larger groups. 
My discussion of collective amnesia in section 10.5 below illustrates some of the ways in which 
memory convergence occurs in conflictual contexts. 
when the audience does not pay close attention to the speaker or does not identify with him or 
her. In the first case members of the audience may not retrieve any representations; in the second 
listeners, who are critical of the speaker, may well remember other things he or she has left 
unmentioned (Stone and Hirst 2014).10 The account cannot equally accommodate other 
surprising results. In particular, it cannot easily explain why, provided that the audience largely 
agrees or identifies with the speaker, SS-RIF is inversely related to perceived expertise and 
trustworthiness. That is to say, SS-RIF effects increase when the audience perceives the speaker 
to be untrustworthy or not to be an expert (Koppel et al. 2014; Hirst and Echterhoff 2011). 
In sum, the empirical evidence reviewed in this and the preceding section indicates that 
collective memories can contribute to strengthening social bonds by shaping shared group 
identities. The evidence also indicates that collective memories are formed by mechanisms of 
selection and construction which, because of SS-RIF effects and of social contagion, facilitate 
the convergence of previously divergent memories onto a shared—possibly fabricated—version 
of the past. Other aspects of the past, which were initially remembered by some individuals, are 
instead crowded out and become almost unretrievably forgotten. 
10.3 Scaffolded Cognition  
                                                 
10 In Belgium, the French-speaking audience exhibited SS-RIF effects after listening to a bilingual pre-
recorded speech by the king, whilst the Flemish-speaking audience did not. Since the king is more 
closely associated with the French-speaking community, the authors of the study speculated that 
Flemish-speaking listeners either did not pay attention or were sceptical about what the king said and 
thus covertly retrieved different memories (Stone and Hirst 2014) 
In section 10.2 I have explained that human biological memory is malleable and subject to 
modification by means of social influences. These facts are no surprise given that memory is an 
instrument for the enhancement of social bonds. In this section I first outline the concept of 
scaffolded cognition before showing that human memory is often scaffolded. I also argue that 
scaffolding does not always serve the purpose of facilitating cognition, it can also work to inhibit 
it. In other words, ignorance as well as knowledge can be scaffolded. 
Scaffolded cognition is cognition which relies on scaffolds, where a scaffold is something— 
typically outside the skin of the cognizer—that shapes, structures, or directs cognition.11 
Scaffolds are usually thought to facilitate the successful completion of cognitive tasks by 
lowering the cognitive load they require or by allowing the cognizer to succeed in tasks which he 
or she would be unable to perform without support (Kirsh 1995; Sterelny 2007, 2010).12 
Scaffolds vary both in their nature and in the manner in which they facilitate cognition. They 
include other people (such as teachers), epistemic technologies (such as notebooks, maps, and 
charts, or pen and paper), and modified environments constructed to serve as informational 
niches (such as the files in an archive or tools in a workplace). They facilitate cognition by 
simplifying choices, by transforming hard problems into perceptual tasks that are easier to solve, 
                                                 
11 Some supporters of scaffolded cognition present the view as an alternative to the claim that the mind—
and therefore knowledge and cognition—can be extended outside the body (Sterelny 2010). In this 
chapter my adoption of the view that cognition is scaffolded is not to be taken as a rejection of the 
possibility of extended minds. 
12 For a history of the study of scaffolding in cognition and for a careful taxonomy of the various 
meanings of the term in different areas of study, see Sutton (2016). The notion has played an especially 
significant role in education theory. See van de Pol et al. (2010) for a review. 
and by directing learning. For instance, pen and paper and the use of the carrying procedure are a 
great help when doing long additions. The task can be simplified further by being turned into the 
perceptual and motor task of punching the numbers into a calculator and reading off the result. 
The construction of informational niches that facilitate problem solving is not always an 
intentional process, since space can be structured to support cognition through a process of co-
adaptation. Two brief examples illustrate the point. First, niches can be brought into existence by 
purely stigmergic behaviour (a kind of indirect coordination). For instance, navigation from 
location A to location B is made easier when repeated walking between the two places creates a 
path. Thus, a task which may have previously required a map and/or local knowledge is 
transformed into the essentially visual and motor task of following the path (Marsh and Onof 
2008). 
Second, Internet search engines offer a different—more complex—but instructive example. 
Search strategies adopted by users and the development of algorithms for the engine are the 
outcome of mutual adaptation. Search engines facilitate the task of finding relevant information 
of decent quality. They are essential since the Internet is a highly epistemically polluted 
environment which comprises an enormous amount of information that is of mixed quality and 
unsorted for relevance. Once search engines became available, users started to use them in a new 
way. Instead of searching for information resources such as websites, they begun to rely on the 
engines directly to find answers to questions. 
This change in search strategy is predicted by information foraging theory which states that, 
whenever access to information is made easier, individuals begin to visit more sites and spend 
only sufficient time on each to extract a nugget of relevant information (Taraborelli 2008). The 
information hunter, according to this theory, does not commit to reading carefully any one site in 
search for highly reliable and relevant information since she may emerge empty-handed. Instead, 
she adopts the less risky strategy of accepting many bits of information of lesser relevance and 
reliability which she can more easily acquire through moving from site to site. 
The algorithms of search engines are constantly refined in response to users’ behaviour to 
facilitate their foraging. Individuals rarely make independent assessments of the quality and 
relevance of the information provided by websites. Instead, they rely on cues (information scent) 
which are detectable without accessing them. Such cues range from “likes” on social media to 
rankings offered by the engine. Since these are reputational markers, they are usually indicative 
solely of popularity and bear no connection to quality or reliability. 13 
The co-adaptation of search engines and Internet users’ foraging behaviour offers an 
example of scaffolding that facilitates both knowledge and ignorance. Without search engines, it 
would be almost impossible to acquire new knowledge from the Internet. These engines are 
therefore scaffolds that have expanded the range of users’ problem-solving ability. However, the 
benefits offered by the engines have come at a price because the quality and accuracy of 
information is compromised in the service of speed. 
The idea that tools that support cognition can inhibit knowledge rather than promote it has, 
as far as I am aware, gone unnoticed so far. Yet, for instance, there are environments which are 
designed to make successful searches more cognitively demanding by transforming what would 
be a memory task into a visual search task within an environment where the target object is not 
prominent. Retail space is a revealing example of an environment which is deliberately designed 
                                                 
13 Since each “like” or preference is not expressed independently of others but in the knowledge of what 
has proven popular to date, there is no reason to think of this case as an example of the so-called 
wisdom of the crowd. 
to make knowledge harder to gain. The big supermarket chains develop planograms detailing 
where to place various kinds of produce on their shelves. Their main aim is to make you spend as 
much money as possible. To achieve this goal, they invite you into the shop where they slow you 
down and make you traverse as much of the floor space as possible. Numerous techniques are 
deployed to achieve these objectives: shuffling the products around is one of these. Since the 
location of the product on the shelves is changed on a regular basis, it is impossible for the 
customer to grab and go. Instead, one must search extensively for what one wants so that one 
will also come across other items which one may impulsively buy. The shopper’s increased 
cognitive load is a success for the planogrammer, since it is the means by which his or her aim of 
making the shopper see as much of the produce as possible is achieved. 
The literature on scaffolded cognition has not paid sufficient attention scaffolding for 
ignorance because of its focus on adaptation and cooperation. However, adaptation often leads to 
satisficing rather than optimizing strategies which may well compromise quality for speed. In 
addition, human behaviour is not always cooperative. Instead, some agents may pursue their self-
interest to the detriment of other individuals. Sterelny has referred to cases such as these as 
examples of informational niches as ‘contested spaces’ in which epistemic tools may increase 
rather than decrease cognitive load. He acknowledges the existence of the phenomenon but 
thinks of it as relatively rare (Sterelny 2010, 474). I disagree since I believe that most public 
spaces are in part contested since power relations are omnipresent. 
Be that as it may, for my purposes here the significant point is that a scaffold is an epistemic 
tool, such as a notebook, or an informational niche (like a path or a classroom or a supermarket) 
which modifies and structures cognition. These have developed by adaptation and design and are 
often shared. We should thus expect scaffolds both to facilitate and hinder cognition. First, the 
contested nature of space means that some may litter it with misinformation and other forms of 
epistemic pollution as an obstacle preventing others from gaining knowledge. Second, the shared 
nature of epistemic tools requires standardization so that they may fit better the needs of some 
epistemic agents rather than those of others.14 Third, adaptation typically results in compromises 
thus one should expect trade-offs where epistemic goods are gained at the expense of the loss of 
others. These features of the processes involved in the construction of informational niches and 
the production of epistemic tool suggest that we gain a better understanding of the phenomena 
involved if we adopt the label ‘scaffold’ to refer to bracings of cognition that enable it, but also 
to those which hinder it, since in many instances one and the same item has both effects. 
Memory is perhaps the most scaffolded among human cognitive activities. We seem to have 
learnt a long time ago to offload the task of retaining accurate information about the past to 
external devices such as diaries and record books. Thus, whilst discussions as to whether the 
mind is extended to include epistemic technologies within its boundaries tend to focus on the 
similarities between biological memory and technology-enhanced memory, what is perhaps most 
striking is how different the two kinds of memory are from each other (Sutton 2010). We rely on 
external information storage devices so much precisely because they have features that human 
brains lack. They are designed to store a vast amount of information, in a way that is almost 
permanent and whose retrieval is unconstrained (Donald 1991). Of course, the cleverer humans 
have become at creating such storing devices the less they need to retain information within their 
biological memories. However, this process of offloading information has also increased the 
need to learn how to access it without being overwhelmed by epistemic pollution (Sterelnyi 
                                                 
14 Otto’s highly individual notebook is in this regard not typical of epistemic tools (Sterelny 2010). 
2007: 218–19). The outcome is a trade-off between cognitive load and quality of information in 
terms of accuracy and relevance. 
The scaffolding of biological memory does not consist exclusively in the creation of devices 
for external storage; we have also structured physical spaces to facilitate the making and the 
retrieval of memories. For instance, the sole purpose of so-called mementoes is to cue the recall 
of special events or people in our lives. We have invented mnemonics that cue semantic 
memory. Thus, we use the knuckles in our hands to remember which months have thirty-one 
days. We also organize our living environment to make remembering easy. We tend to keep 
things in the same place, pin reminders to places like the fridge door where we regularly see 
them. Another way in which we scaffold human memory is by creating bodily habits and rituals 
whose purpose is to facilitate carrying out daily routines. For example, we celebrate 
anniversaries and birthdays to make and retrieve memories of our lives and of those of 
significant others. 
The mechanisms of social contagion, and the effects of repetition and retrieval described in 
section 10.2 above can also be understood as scaffolding shared memories. They assist their 
formation, but they facilitate this task at the cost of accuracy and comprehensiveness, since they 
assist the implantation of false memories and promote the forgetting of selected aspects of the 
past. Thus, the scaffolding of human biological memory facilitates both memory knowledge and 
memory ignorance. 
10.4 Ignorance as an Achievement  
There is a large and growing literature in analytic epistemology on knowledge as an achievement 
due to cognitive ability (Pritchard 2009; Sosa 2007; Greco 2012).15 Intuitively, however, 
ignorance is also something that can be credited to the cognitive efforts of epistemic agents. 
Thus, the example above concerning shelving in supermarkets, for instance, illustrates that one 
person’s ignorance can be another’s success. In this section I offer an account of what it takes for 
ignorance to be an achievement. I use the label ‘strong ignorance’ to refer to this kind of 
ignorance. The term is apt since this is an epistemic bad which is generally harder to remove than 
ordinary ignorance.16 In what follows I first provide the foundations of a theory of ignorance as 
the opposite of knowledge-wh, rather than of propositional knowledge. Second, I argue for some 
further conditions which are necessary for an instance of ignorance to be also an achievement. 
These conditions are closely related to those which must be fulfilled if a true belief is to count as 
propositional knowledge. I conclude the section by mentioning three families of cases where 
ignorance is an achievement: self-deception and wishful thinking; deception and the transmission 
of misleading information; cognitive states formed within an informational niche which, by 
design or adaptation, increases cognitive load. 
Until recently the nature of ignorance was a much neglected topic in analytic epistemology. 
Instead, ignorance was often presumed simply to be the contradictory of propositional 
                                                 
15 In this literature there is a lively debate on how to spell out the senses in which the success is due to the 
cognitive ability. Greco (2012) offers a clear summary of some of the existing options. 
16 I take my notion of ‘strong ignorance’ to be of a piece with the notion discussed in the so-called 
epistemologies of ignorance (Mills 2007; Tuana 2004 and 2006; Dotson 2011). My account differs 
from theirs in several respects. Most significantly, I do not offer a consequentialist analysis of the 
difference between mere and strong ignorance. 
knowledge. As Rik Peel (2010, 2011, 2012) has convincingly argued this view is incorrect since 
the person who has a true belief based on a hunch lacks propositional knowledge but is not 
ignorant. However, the possibility that ignorance may be the contradictory of knowledge-wh 
(which, where, what, who) has not been addressed in the existing philosophical literature. A full 
defence of this position is beyond the scope of this chapter; in what follows I limit myself to 
offering some considerations in its support. 
Firstly, and most superficially, attributions of ignorance in the English language share some 
of the syntactical constructions of knowledge wh- attributions. For instance, one may be said to 
be ignorant of the effects of exposure to radiation or to know what they are. Both constructions 
can take a noun phrase (e.g ‘the effects of exposure to radiation’) or a sentential complement 
(e.g., ‘what the effects of exposure to radiation are’). Attributions of propositional knowledge are 
different since they consist of verb + that + sentence. Secondly, ignorance attributions appear to 
be close in meaning to denials of knowledge wh-. Thus, a person who is ignorant of something is 
someone who does not know what that something is. Someone who is ignorant of her location is 
someone who does not know where she is. Thirdly, attributions of knowledge wh- and of 
ignorance exhibit the same kind of context-sensitivity. It has been noted that a person who has 
just landed at Heathrow airport, may be said to know where she is, even if all she knows is that 
she is in London. In this instance, it is natural to think that she is not ignorant of her location. 
However, one would also be inclined to say of that same person, once a taxi drops her off 
somewhere in the City, that she does not know where she is, although she still knows that she is 
in London. In this instance one is also prepared to attribute to her ignorance of her location. 
Since the context-sensitivity of knowledge wh- has often been cashed out in terms of relativity to 
the informational needs of the attributor, there is a prima facie case for adopting the same 
position about attributions of ignorance.17 
One attributes knowledge of her location to the person who has landed at Heathrow because 
she possesses an adequate answer to the question ‘where are you?’ which is embedded in the 
knowledge attribution. The answer ‘I am in London’ is true and is also serviceable as an answer 
since all the attributor plausibly wishes to know is the name of a city. However, when one asks 
whether a person, who is somewhere in the City, knows where she is, one is asking whether she 
knows where she is in relation to other destinations in London; one is not asking whether a 
person knows that she is in London rather than in Paris. Plausibly, the same considerations apply 
to attributions of ignorance, since we ascribe ignorance to those who cannot easily provide 
adequate answers to our questions, where an answer is adequate when it is both true and 
                                                 
17 There is a lively debate on how attributions of knowledge wh- should be understood. I shall not address 
it here. However, it is generally assumed that knowledge at least requires possessing a true belief 
which answers the question embedded in the attribution. It is also agreed that they are context 
sensitive. For a review, see Parent (2014). I owe the idea that the correctness of knowledge attributions 
may depend on the local and global informational needs attached to the attributor’s practical tasks to 
Greco’s (2012) discussion of propositional knowledge as true belief which is a success attributable to 
ability. 
serviceable given the questioner’s informational needs attached to the actual (or potential) 
practical task at hand.18, 19 
In sum, ignorance is best understood as lack of knowledge wh-, which in turn can be 
understood as follows: 
S knows wh-Q only if S believes (or could easily believe) that p, p is true, p is an/the 
answer to the embedded question Q given the informational needs of the inquirer 
attached to actual or potential practical tasks in the context of attribution.20 
Ignorance therefore is defined in the following terms 
                                                 
18 These considerations should not be taken to imply that contrastivism is true of ignorance ascriptions. 
The relativity to context may be a pragmatic phenomenon rather than a semantic one. The same debate 
emerges regarding knowledge wh- attributions (Parent 2014). 
19 It might be argued that the example relies on an equivocation about location. The person, who knows 
that she is in London but has no more detailed knowledge of her thereabouts, would be ignorant 
because she does not possess a true belief about her exact location. Thus, this example could be 
explained by the view that ignorance is absence of true belief (cf. Peels 2010). However, note that even 
a person who knows her exact coordinates may be said to be ignorant of her location if she does not 
know where the place she occupies is in the relation to her destination. It is not plausible to think a 
specification of location must also detail its relations to all other places. It is more plausible to explain 
these cases by taking ignorance ascriptions to be context relative in the same manner as knowledge wh- 
attributions. Thanks to Duncan Pritchard for the objection. 
20 Sometimes we attribute knowledge wh- to people who do not have, but are able quickly to find out, the 
information required to answer the embedded question. See Farkas (2016). 
S is ignorant of the answer to Q if it is not the case that S believes (or could easily 
believe) that p, p is true, an/the answer to the embedded question Q given the 
informational needs of the inquirer attached to actual or potential practical tasks in the 
context of attribution. 
Armed with this account of ignorance as what is ascribed in attributions of ignorance we can 
begin to home onto the narrow subset of examples of ignorance which are also an achievement. 
This is the kind of ignorance which I have stipulated to label ‘strong ignorance’. We may 
approach it by noting that ignorance can be the result of bad luck, it can be a mistake due to an 
occasional or persistent malfunction of a cognitive process, or it can be the outcome of cognitive 
activity functioning well. First, ignorance may be caused by bad luck. For example, a person 
may not know where she is because the compass on which she relies is broken. Alternatively, an 
individual in a dark room may be ignorant of what is in front of his eyes even though he has 
twenty-twenty vision.21 
Second, ignorance may be the outcome of failing cognitive faculties. For instance, one may 
be ignorant of the sum of two numbers because one has made an adding mistake. One may be 
unable to remember what one had for dinner the night before because one’s short-term episodic 
memory is impaired due to the aging process. These are cases of cognitive malfunctioning which 
lead to ignorance. 
                                                 
21 These two examples may be analogous to the two kinds of good luck—intervening and 
environmental—that can conspire to give rise to a true belief which is not knowledge. See Pritchard 
(2009) for the distinction between two kinds of luck. 
But, third, ignorance may also result from cognitive activity which is functioning normally 
(and is not affected by bad luck). To appreciate why ignorance may be produced in this manner, 
it is useful to consider both the practical and informational needs that an actual or potential 
inquirer may have. In what follows I use the term ‘attributor’ for the person who attributes 
ignorance to a person and ‘attributee’ for the person to whom ignorance is attributed. In cases of 
self-attribution, the attributor and the attributee are the same person. 
Plausibly, every human being has a standing global informational need that others are good 
informants. Thus, every attributor needs any attributee to know the answers to all questions. This 
is true even if the attributor knows the answer to a given question and thus does not need to be 
told. It is still in her interest that other people also know the answer since such knowledge may 
be necessary if they are to serve as informants on other matters of which the attributor has no 
knowledge. However, an attributor may also have practical needs which are driven by goals that 
do not concern the acquisition of accurate information. For example, he may need to keep some 
attributee ignorant. The attributor may have hidden something which he does not want anybody 
to find. An attributor can thus have a practical need that others do not know the answer to a 
question despite also possessing a standing informational need that they do. To this end, she may 
mislead other people so that they are ignorant of the relevant answer. Their ignorance is not mere 
bad luck; it is also not the product of a cognitive error or malfunction. Rather, they have been 
deprived of the means to acquire the necessary information. 
I am now able to explain what it means to say that some ignorance is an achievement. My 
account is based on the intuition that epistemic bads, as well as epistemic goods, can have this 
status since achievements are successes that can be credited to someone because they are the 
product of their abilities. Strong ignorance, is characterized as follows: 
S is strongly ignorant of the answer to Q only if (a) S is ignorant of the answer to Q and 
(b) S’s ignorance is a success which is creditable to S’s cognitive ability. 
Before explaining each element of this characterization, it might be helpful to offer an example. 
Suppose that I think that my professional career is a success. I may, when wondering how it all 
came about, form the view that my achievements are exclusively the product of my own hard 
work and talent rather than partly of white privilege.22 Suppose that this answer to my own 
question is false, but I need to believe it. Perhaps I would find it hard to maintain self-confidence 
in the absence of this comforting thought. I could not, of course, sustain the conviction if I 
realized that it is the product of wishful thinking. Thus, I must form my opinion by considering 
evidence, rather than plucking the answer out of thin air. In truth, the desire to believe that I owe 
my success exclusively to my efforts biases the formulation of the hypotheses about the causes 
of my success and the selection of the considered evidence. I may reason correctly given the 
evidence that I bring to bear on the case, but I ignore other evidence that supports a different 
conclusion.23 
This example illustrates what is generally known in the psychological literature as goal-
driven motivated cognition (Kunda 1990). Cognitive activity is effortful, so motives are required 
                                                 
22 If you do not find it plausible that people who think this are engaging in self-deception choose the less 
controversial example of the person who thinks of her first born that she is the smartest kid in her class 
despite evidence showing that her abilities are average. 
23 An opinion formed because of self-deception may nonetheless be true. When this happens one may not 
be ignorant. But note that we are prepared to say that someone, who guesses the right responses in a 
quiz, knows the answers. Guessing right or hitting on the right answer, despite engaging in wishful 
thinking, may result in knowledge wh- rather than in ignorance. 
to initiate it. At times, it is occasioned by a desire to acquire accurate information; at other times, 
practical needs such as the preservation of self-esteem are the main drivers of cognitive activity. 
When these practical considerations motivate cognition, such activity is said to be goal-driven as 
in the case of wishful thinking. 
My ignorance in this example would fit the characterization of strong ignorance. First, the 
belief is a case of ignorance given that it is false (and therefore not an adequate answer to the 
question). Second, the belief is a success which is creditable to my cognitive ability. The belief is 
a success because it is the outcome of cognitive activity which, in producing it, achieves my 
overall aim. Thus, in the same way in which true belief counts as a success when it is the 
outcome of accuracy-driven motivated cognition, false beliefs which enhance self-esteem can be 
the product of successful goal-driven cognition.24 Further, the success of the belief (its capacity 
to enhance self-esteem) is to be credited to my competence. It is because I reasoned and 
considered evidence that I can sustain the ultimately false belief. Goal-driven motivated 
cognition is a cognitive ability whose aim is to achieve the goals that drive it. In this case it 
functioned well and it is because of its good functioning that the successful belief was its 
product. In sum, my ignorance is an epistemic bad that is creditable to me in the sense of being 
something that I have achieved. 
Using this example as a springboard, I am now able to spell out in more detail what it means 
for a state of ignorance to be a success which is due to cognitive ability. The person who is 
ignorant does not have an adequate answer to a question. The question is implicit in the 
attribution of ignorance; one lacks an adequate answer when one does not possess an answer 
                                                 
24 See Sosa 2007 for the view that accurate belief is successful belief. 
which would satisfy the informational needs of the attributor. Since standing informational needs 
are global, a false answer is never adequate. Ignorance, however, does not require that one has 
false beliefs. One may be ignorant because one has a true belief which is not an adequate answer 
to the question at issue. Alternatively, one may simply have no opinion. 
The attributor of ignorance, however, also has further practical needs which are not related 
to the need for accurate information. The state of ignorance is a success when it satisfies a 
preponderance of these practical needs. In the example above the belief is a success because it 
satisfies the need for self-enhancement. When I asked myself a question about my professional 
career, I aimed to have an answer that raised my self-esteem, my putative answer in so far as it 
achieves that goal is a success.25 
The success is due to competence or cognitive ability (as opposed to luck) whenever two 
conditions apply. First, the resulting state of ignorance is an outcome of cognition functioning 
well in the sense of achieving its aim. Both temporary error and more permanent impairment are 
absent. Second, the telling contribution to the success is the contribution made by those 
functioning cognitive abilities. More undoubtedly needs to be said about the idea of a telling 
contribution. However, we can get to grip with the notion by way of an analogy discussed by 
John Greco (2012). He notes that in football, goals are ascribed to the players who put the ball 
into the net, even though their contributions may have been less skilful than those of the team 
mates who made the assist. The achievement is credited to the goal scorers because it was their 
                                                 
25 More needs to be said to justify the claim that ignorance attributions are relative to the needs of the 
attributor rather than those of the attributee. The argument is like those made in accounts of knowledge 
wh- attributions. 
contributions that made the difference to the score and thus made the whole action a success.26 In 
the example discussed here, the belief is a success because it satisfies the attributor’s need for an 
answer that enhances self-esteem. The success is due to cognitive ability because (a) it is the 
outcome of cognition functioning well, and (b) it is the contribution of this cognitive activity 
makes it the success it is (since a comforting thought plucked out of thin air would not have 
sustained conviction). 
Deception and the offering of misleading information are also paradigmatic examples of 
strong ignorance. On these occasions the people who are ignorant (attributees) and those who 
ascribe ignorance to them (attributors) are distinct. For instance, imagine that the spokespeople 
for a tobacco corporation intend to spread doubt about the health effects of smoking to counter 
messages that it causes cancer. These individuals point to evidence that raises questions about 
the validity of studies that link smoking to cancer. In this manner, they may succeed in throwing 
some people into a state of doubt. By supplying misleading (but perhaps true) information the 
representatives of the tobacco industry have induced a state of ignorance in some consumers. It is 
obvious that those who doubt do not possess an answer to the relevant question about the causes 
of cancer that would address the global standing needs for accurate information that even public 
relation executives possess. Thus, the consumers are ignorant. However, their ignorance is a 
success given the practical needs of the representatives of the tobacco industry that people 
continue smoking. Further, it is a success which is in part due to propaganda. Thinking, 
                                                 
26 My view of strong ignorance as a success attributable to cognitive ability is heavily indebted to Greco 
(2012) where he argues for an account of knowledge in these terms. He also cashes out attributability 
as a pragmatic relation that holds between the state that is a success and those elements among its 
causes that made it a success. 
reasoning, and in general a lot of cognitive effort went into devising persuasive messages. 
Therefore, among the causes of the successful state of doubt are the well-functioning cognitive 
activities of the individuals who spread misleading information. However, the person who is 
misled also engages her cognitive faculties when reaching the state of doubt. She considers the 
misleading evidence, she evaluates it, and thus she withholds belief. Perhaps, she rationally 
revises her previous view about the carcinogenic properties of cigarette smoke. It is her 
contribution to the production of doubt which is telling in making it a success, since she now 
believes that there is insufficient evidence to form an opinion. It is her conviction that doubt is 
the rational position grounded on her exercise of her cognitive activities that makes it such a 
success for the tobacco industry, since it gives her reasons not to make further inquiries.27 
A third kind of strong ignorance is exemplified by cognitive states formed in informational 
niches which, by design or adaptation, increase cognitive load. I have already illustrated this 
phenomenon in my discussion above of how supermarket shelves are stacked to inhibit 
knowledge of the location of products. In this example the practical needs of the planogrammer 
are satisfied when the ignorant consumer is aware of her ignorance and therefore continues 
searching. Hence, the consumer’s ignorance (combined with her awareness of it) is a form of 
success. Further, what makes it such a success is in part the design of the informational niche 
which is tailored to the production of ignorance. However, the telling contribution is made by the 
                                                 
27 We may say that the misled individual is not aware of her ignorance. The presence of higher order 
ignorance is a feature of some of the cases discussed here. However, it is possible to suffer from strong 
ignorance and to know it. It is also possible not to know that one is ignorant, when one’s ignorance is 
solely due to bad luck. 
shopper’s cognitive capacity to appreciate her ignorance since it is this awareness that prompts 
her to search the shelves further. 
10.5 Collective Amnesia  
In section 10.2 I have reviewed some of the processes by means of which individuals’ memories 
converge to become shared memories. This discussion highlighted the fact that forgetting is an 
essential part of how shared memories come to be formed. In this section I return to those 
processes to show that, in some cases at least, they involve a kind of forgetfulness that exhibits 
the features characteristic of strong ignorance as defined in section 10.4. I reserve the expression 
‘cultural amnesia’ for strong collective memory ignorance. In this section I offer an account of 
this phenomenon using some hypothetical but plausible examples by way of illustration. I show 
that social contagion, re-exposure and retrieval effects often exemplify the dynamics which I 
singled out in section 10.4 as contributing to the formation of strong ignorance. Here, I present 
memory analogues of wishful thinking, misleading, and deceiving, and memory niches which 
increase the cognitive load required for some kinds of recollecting. In the next section I argue 
that collective memories can enhance the intellectual self-trust of some members of the group, 
whilst the self-trust of others is undermined by collective amnesia. 
I do not take ‘memory’ here to be factive. Thus, I include among memories all those 
representations both accurate and inaccurate which are at least available for retrieval by some 
individual member of a group. Memories may be endorsed as beliefs or discarded upon retrieval 
as inaccurate. Collective memories, as described in section 10.2, are memories which contribute 
to defining the identity of a group. They are enduring because they are endorsed as beliefs; they 
are shared because they are common to most members of the group. 
The first kind of strong memory ignorance has been studied with regard to individual 
memory but may generalize to groups and their collective memories. It is a form of self-
deception or wishful thinking in the service of self-flattery. There is evidence that individuals’ 
autobiographical memories tend to show self-serving biases. These biases correlate positively 
with levels of self-esteem so that those whose self-esteem is high are more biased than others 
(Tafarodi, Marshall, and Milne 2003). The more likely explanation for this outcome is a 
combination of two factors. First, people recall more fluently than other behaviours those actions 
which exemplify traits predictive of success (Sedikides and Gregg 2008). Presumably, this 
tendency is more prominent in individuals whose self-esteem is high. Second, humans have the 
propensity to treat fluency in recall as a proxy for accuracy, so that memories that are fluently 
recalled are likely to be endorsed and therefore believed (Michaelian 2012 and 2016). 
These self-serving memories are an example of strong memory ignorance. They are an 
instance of ignorance because of their inaccuracy. These states of ignorance are achievements 
because each is a success due to cognitive ability. These memories are a success because they 
satisfy the need to sustain self-esteem by forgetting less flattering aspects of past. Self-
enhancement is presumably the motive driving cognition in these cases. In addition, the goal is 
achieved thanks to mnemonic cognition functioning well since fluency in recall is an indicator of 
validity. 
These considerations suggest that those individuals who, because they have high self-
esteem, are likely to speak up on behalf of groups are also the most likely to be ignorant of 
aspects of their autobiographical past which are incongruent with their self-concept. Since 
individuals with higher socioeconomic status tend to have higher self-esteem (Twenge and 
Campbell 2002), those who have the means and the confidence to shape public discourse about 
the past, are precisely the same individuals whose memories are more profoundly shaped by self-
serving biases. 
The second kind of strong memory ignorance derives from the psychological mechanisms 
which facilitate the convergence of memory by promoting the acquisition of some memories and 
inhibiting the retention of others. In section 10.2 I have singled out social contagion and retrieval 
effects such as SS-RIF which cause initially divergent memories to converge into one shared 
memory. Very often these mechanisms function in ways that are analogous to deception or to 
the, perhaps involuntary, transmission of misleading information. 
Due to the mediation of social power, perceived expertise, and the ability to take up the role 
of main narrator of past events, the processes involved in memory convergence generate shared 
memories that are closer in content to the initial memories of the most powerful individuals in 
the group than to those of other members (Hirst and Echterhoff 2011). That is to say, the 
memories of individual group members tend to converge onto one version of the past which is 
profoundlly shaped by the original (self-serving) memories of dominant members. 
Several mechanisms contribute to this outcome. There is evidence that perceived expertise, 
and especially the ability to assume the role of narrator, facilitate social contagion. These 
individuals can more easily than others spread their false or selective recollections to other 
members of the group (Brown, Coman and Hirst 2009). Explicit retrieval generates re-exposure 
effects that consolidate and strengthen the memories thus retrieved. Powerful individuals have 
better opportunities to recount their version of the past through public speaking. If their 
audiences covertly retrieve the same memories when listening, they are more likely to remember 
the facts in those terms. These effects are equally present in informal contexts. In addition, 
explicit retrieval generates SS-RIF effects. These are especially prominent when simultaneously 
listeners covertly retrieve the memories recalled by the speakers either because they identify with 
these individuals or, if they don’t fully trust them, to monitor their words for accuracy. 
Therefore, narrators cause RIF effects in those who identify with them but also in those who are 
somewhat suspicious of their accuracy.28 
In short, all of these mechanisms conspire to the creation of shared memories which 
converge in the direction of the recollections voiced by the most powerful members of the group. 
These can include false memories which have been deliberately or involuntarily implanted into 
the group as a whole. In addition, because of mnemonic silence manifested as lack of re-
exposure and as RIF effects the initial memories of marginalized group members become 
increasingly harder to retrieve. As absence of fluency is proxy for invalidity, these memories 
when retrieved are unlikely to be believed. 
I have detailed how these processes generate states of ignorance. These are examples of 
strong memory ignorance because they are successes due to cognitive ability. They are 
achievements because they serve the practical needs of those narrators who have shaped the 
conversation about the group’s collective past since they would rather have aspects of the past, 
which are not congruent with their self-concept or which they judge to be trivial, be forgotten. 
Ignorance in these instances is due to the cognitive abilities of all, including those individuals 
whose initial memories are being replaced with the memories recollected by others. These people 
are the audience to the speech of the narrators. It is their covert retrieval of memory 
representations that generates re-exposure and RIF effects; it facilitates fluency of further 
retrieval which in turn promotes endorsement as belief. The telling contribution in the creation of 
                                                 
28 Those who don’t pay attention and those who strongly disagree with the speakers are less prone to the 
same effects. 
successful ignorance is made by the cognitive abilities of the individual whose memories are 
shaped in these ways, since it is this contribution that leads to the endorsement of the false or 
misleading memories as valid. 
The third kind of strong memory ignorance is due to the creation of memory environmental 
niches which increase the cognitive load required to find adequate answers to some non-trivial 
questions about the past. A memory niche is an aspect of one’s surroundings that cues some 
memories and inhibits others. Many aspects of the built environment serve this scaffolding role. 
They include: street toponomy which singles out some individuals, events, or groups as worth 
remembering; monuments for the commemoration of special events (such as the Cenotaph); 
statues which memorialize distinguished historical figures (Nelson’s column, for example); and 
commemorative ceremonies.29 
These are among the mementoes for the whole of society. Their presence facilitates the 
implantation of false memories such as those surrounding the myths of the civilizing power of 
European colonizing empires. It consolidates some selective memories by virtue of re-exposure 
effects. Memorials to the war dead, for example, often portray heroism and sometimes horror. 
They rarely portray moments of weakness or despair which must have undoubtedly occurred. In 
this manner, they assist the retrieval of a selected range of representations of the people or events 
that they commemorate. Although current research on SS-RIF has focused exclusively on the 
retrieval-induced forgetting effects of remembering through conversation, it seems at least 
plausible that other cues for covert retrieval should have the same or similar effects.30 Hence, 
                                                 
29 It is not only objects that serve as cues. Ritual ceremonies are equally important. They are the focus of 
Connerton (1996). 
30 This hypothesis is singled out by Stone and Hirst (2014) as an avenue for future research. 
monuments may consolidate shared memories of people and episodes that are highly selective. 
Because they may also inhibit the recollection of other, less flattering or convenient, aspects of 
the same individuals and events, they are misleading and facilitate the spread of ignorance. If this 
is right, memorials promote both memory and forgetting (cf. Connerton 2009, 29). It is therefore 
not surprising that political revolutions are often marked by the removal of cues memorializing 
aspects of the previous regime since this is an effective way of consigning it to oblivion. 
Memorials are expensive to build and to maintain. They are generally commissioned by the 
state, powerful institutions, or rich individuals who are therefore able to determine which aspects 
of the past are remembered and the manner of their remembrance. This outcome is intended by 
those who have these monuments erected. Monuments are thus elements of niches promoting 
strong ignorance in the citizenry. They facilitate ignorance about some aspects of the past. This 
ignorance is a success since memorials are designed to memorialize but also to ignore some 
unflattering aspects of the past. The telling contribution to the achievement is made by the public 
whose memory is functioning well when it forms selective and misleading beliefs about its 
collective past. 
10.6 Intellectual Self-Trust, Collective Memories, Collective 
Amnesia  
In section 10.5 I discussed the role of memory in the enhancement and preservation of self-
esteem. In this section I pursue the topic further by arguing that collective memory and amnesia 
enhance the intellectual self-trust of some members of the community whilst undermining that 
possessed by others. 
For my purposes here, I adopt Karen Jones’ account of intellectual self-trust as a cognitive 
and affective stance of optimism towards one’s cognitive capacities in a given domain. This 
stance of optimism is characterized by confidence in one’s own abilities, a belief in the reliability 
of one’s cognitive faculties, a tendency to assert what one takes to be deliverances of one’s 
methods, and a disposition to reflect on one’s belief only when there is a genuine need to do so 
(2012).31 Intellectual self-trust is often self-enhancing. Those who trust their cognitive capacities 
use the same capacities to assess whether they can be trusted.32 Thus, independently of whether 
one’s capacities are actually reliable, reliance on them may increase trust in their reliability.33 
Further, intellectual self-trust is socially acquired. One learns to trust one’s competence by being 
helped by others to improve one’s cognitive performance and then by having the reliability of 
one’s opinion confirmed by others one trusts. 
Intellectual self-trust is, as Jones notes (2012, 245) sensitive to social power. Those who are 
in a position of power are likely to develop excessive optimism about their cognitive capacities 
in many domains because their power wins them deference. Since other people tend—out of fear, 
servility, or self-interest—to agree with them, socially dominant people form a false impression 
about the reliability and power of their cognitive capacities. This false belief in turn causes them 
to be unwarrantedly confident in their ability. Similar mechanisms in reverse lead people in 
subordinated positions to become exceedingly unconfident in their abilities. Thus, they may be 
                                                 
31 Intellectual self-trust is appropriate only when one’s cognitive capacities in the given domain are 
reliable and thus warrant optimism about them. 
32 This circularity as Zagzebski (2012) has argued is unavoidable. 
33 Provided that their deliverances do not contradict one another. 
more distrusting of their capacities than the situation warrants. However, self-distrust works as a 
self-fulfilling prophecy since those who do not trust their abilities will develop timidity and 
intellectual servility, and become less capable as a result.34 Hence, power promotes the 
miscalibration of self-trust towards inflation in those who occupy positions of dominance and 
deflation in those who are subordinated. 
Collective amnesia contributes to this phenomenon. I have argued that collective memories 
converge in the direction of the memories of the powerful. Whenever these memories are self-
serving their adoption by the group as a whole functions to boost the intellectual self-trust of 
members of dominant groups. Even a short reflection on the representations of Black British 
people in contemporary collective memories of Britishness is sufficient to illustrate the point. 
If you are not a member of a Black or Minority Ethnic community yourself, it is likely that 
the first representations of Black Britishness that come to mind represent Black people as a 
problem (Gilroy 1987). They are either victims of crime (Stephen Laurence), individuals whose 
presence in numbers undermines social cohesiveness (migrants in the 1950s or more recently), or 
finally people who engage in criminal behaviour (rioters and gang members). I presume that 
these memories have acquired prominence thanks to the memory mechanisms discussed above. 
These memories have the effect of decreasing self-confidence in those who are represented as 
problems. This dynamic is corrosive of self-trust in a further insidious way. Those, whose self-
confidence is undermined and who lose intellectual self-trust as a result, are more likely to 
perceive others as being their intellectual superiors. Since this perception facilitates social 
contagion of memories, the process is likely to consolidate memories that promote further self-
                                                 
34 On timidity and servility see Tanesini (2016 and Forthcoming). 
distrust; thus, they initiate and preserve a vicious circle that deflates the confidence of those who 
already distrust themselves and inflates the confidence of the overly confident. 
10.7 Memorial Injustice.  
Collective amnesia, I have argued, exacerbates miscalibrations of intellectual self-trust. In this 
section I argue that this dynamic is a distinct form of epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustice is ‘a 
kind of injustice in which someone is wronged specifically in her capacity as a knower’ (Fricker 
2007, 20). Epistemic injustice is not a species of distributive injustice. Thus, it is not to be 
understood as the unfair distribution of epistemic goods.35 Rather, it is an injustice that one 
suffers when one is wronged because one is not treated in the way in which persons should be 
treated. The wrong is epistemic, and thus an epistemic injustice, when the ill treatment concerns 
the person qua epistemic agent; that is to say, it regards that person’s cognitive capacities. 
Respect and self-respect are important aspects of what it takes to treat other people and 
oneself in a manner consonant with personhood. There are, however, many forms of respect and 
self-respect. Fundamental among these are: evaluative, and recognition. Evaluative respect and 
self-respect are respect based on a proper evaluation of a person’s (intellectual) qualities (Dillon 
2007; Tanesini 2016) Hence, there is individual variance in the amount of evaluative respect 
which is due to one. Recognition respect and self-respect are respect based on the recognition 
that an individual is an (epistemic) agent. Recognition respect is due in equal measure to all 
agents. Recognition self-respect includes an unreflective attitude of appreciation of one’s self-
                                                 
35 For this reason someone whose credibility is wrongly inflated may still be said to be suffering an 
injustice. 
worth. It is manifested in a sense of confidence in one’s own abilities and value. Intellectual self-
trust as I defined it above is one of the manifestations of recognition self-respect. 
Different kinds of epistemic injustice can be distinguished by the kind of disrespect they 
exemplify. Testimonial injustice is a wrong because it is a lack of evaluative respect. In Fricker’s 
account testimonial injustice is a credibility deficit due to identity prejudice (2007, 28). Those 
who are on the receiving of it are treated with less respect than they deserve given their personal 
intellectual qualities. Hermeneutical injustice is also a wrong because it results in a lack of 
evaluative self-respect. Hermeneutical injustice is often systematic so that there is not a specific 
behaviour by some individual which exemplifies it. Instead, it occurs when, because of identity 
prejudice, the epistemic community lacks the conceptual resources required to understand a 
significant area of experience of a group of individuals within it (2007, 155). Although no one in 
the community can understand fully this aspect of the experience of some of its members, only 
those whose experiences are thus obscured are aware that something important is missing. 
Because of their inability to articulate their experiences, and the presumptions that this is 
indicative of a lacuna on their part, they are likely to underestimate their intellectual abilities and 
thus develop lack of self-respect.36 
The erosion of self-trust, which collective amnesia strengthens and perpetuates, undermines 
evaluative respect and self-respect; but, it also goes deeper because it affects recognition self-
respect. Intellectual self-trust is not a cognitive ability like any other; it is the stance of 
confidence towards one’s abilities which is necessary if we are to exercise any one of them. 
                                                 
36 It goes without saying that the wrong of this injustice is that those who suffer from it do themselves 
wrong as a result. This should not be read as saying that these individuals are culpable for their self-
harm. 
Hence, if one were to lose all intellectual self-trust one would be totally incapacitated. One 
would be endlessly checking and re-checking the deliveries of one’s cognitive capacities without 
feeling able to rely on them at all. Thus, without some degree of intellectual self-trust one would 
not be an epistemic agent. Consequently, erosion of self-trust undermines one’s ability to treat 
oneself as any epistemic agent should treat herself. In this manner, those who are harmed in their 
capacity to self-trust are forced into a position in which they risk losing their recognition self-
respect. Therefore, to the extent to which cultural amnesia damages intellectual self-trust, it is the 
source of an especially pernicious form of epistemic injustice. 
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